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I.

Introduction

In 2019, Louisiana State University, Clemson University, the University of Oklahoma, and
Ohio State University each received over $6 million dollars for their qualification to the College
Football Playoff.1 Ed Orgeron, the head coach of the national championship winning Louisiana
State, received a bonus of over $500,000 for the team’s accomplishment.2

Despite these

substantial sums, student-athletes on the participating teams were prohibited from using their own
names, images, and likenesses to profit from their own achievements. With a wave of proposed
federal legislation and a pending Supreme Court case coming within months of the conclusion of
the Louisiana State’s championship, it is likely that the 2019 College Football playoff will
represent the final major college championship in which the student-athletes were prohibited from
marketing and profiting from their participation in the event.
The prohibition on student-athlete compensation dates back to the very beginning of collegiate
athletics.3 Supporters of amateurism in college sports argue that amateurism differentiates college
sports from their professional counterparts, and that amateurism advances the legitimate
educational needs of both the student-athletes and their respective colleges and universities.4 As
of the Spring of 2021, however, the amateurism model has never faced such uncertainty. A
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Supreme Court case, a number of proposed federal laws granting student-athletes the ability to
profit from their name, image, and likeness, and mounting public pressure all indicate that the
future of college sports will soon look drastically different than it ever has before.
This comment argues that any federal legislation concerning compensation for NCAA studentathletes should include the establishment of an independent oversight body and allow for studentathletes to enter group licensing deals. The proposed oversight body would serve as a replacement
for a trade association in representing the interests of the student-athletes in negotiating the grouplicensing deals. Importantly, group licensing deals allow student-athletes to profit from such
lucrative markets as video games and memorabilia. The benefits of a third-party oversight body
also include protection of student-athletes from predatory contracts and agents, ensuring
compliance National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) rules and regulations free of
conflicts of interest, and a resource for student-athletes to educate themselves about their possible
profitability.
Included in this federal legislation should also be considerations of the NCAA’s valid interest
in preserving the amateur status of student-athletes and adherence to the guidelines of Title IX.
The protection of amateur status of student-athletes, which is the restriction on NCAA schools
from compensating student-athletes for non-education related activities, is necessary to preserve
the financial security of athletic departments and protect student-athletes who participate in sports
other than football and basketball.
Part II of this note provides a brief history of amateurism in collegiate athletics, as well as an
overview of current legal challenges to the NCAA’s restrictions on “non-educational” benefits to
student-athletes, and state and federal legislation directed at student-athlete compensation. Part III
of this note analyzes the positive and negative aspects of selected legal and legislative challenges

to the NCAA’s current amateurism model and their potential effects on student-athletes rights as
well as collegiate athletic departments. Although this note does not analyze every proposed law
dealing with student-athlete compensation, the topics covered by each bill remain similar and
consistent. Part III of this note also argues that the most beneficial framework for both NCAA
member institutions and student-athletes going forward allows student-athletes to enter into grouplicensing deals and establishes an independent oversight board to oversee student-athlete
compensation deals.

This proposal preserves the amateur status of student-athletes while

providing protection against unfair labor practices and bad-faith actors.
This note aims to reach a compromise between the welfare of student-athletes and their right
to profit from their labor and name, image, and likeness; and the interest in preserving the
difference between college sports and their professional counterparts. The arguments for broader
student-athlete rights, such as healthcare, letters of intent, and transfer eligibility, are beyond the
scope of this article.
PART II
A Brief History of Amateurism in the NCAA
The complicated relationship between amateurism and college sports dates to the early
20th century, when the popularity of college sports rose across the United States.5 Although the
NCAA originally did not specifically define what made an athlete an “amateur” during the
infancy of the Association, member institutions were restricted from providing any form of
compensation for a student’s participation on an athletic team, including scholarships.6 In 1916
and 1922, the NCAA finally attempted to clarify what it meant by “amateurism”, defining an

5
6

Mayer supra note 3 at 50.
Id.

amateur sportsman as “one who engages in sport solely for the physical, mental, or social
benefits he derives therefrom, and to whom the sport is nothing more than an avocation.”7 Nearly
immediately, however, the NCAA found enforcement of its amateurism rules complex and
difficult.8 One report from 1929 found that three quarters of the NCAA’s 112 member
institutions violated the NCAA’s amateurism rules in some way.9
Due in part to the flagrant disregard colleges often had for the restrictions on payment to
student-athletes, the NCAA amended amateurism rules multiple times throughout the 20th
century.10 These amendments allowed for schools to provide athletically related financial aid
limited to tuition and incidental expenses and commonly accepted education related expenses
such as costs for room and board, tuition, and books.11 Additionally, the NCAA restricted the
award of multiyear scholarships to student-athletes.12 This decision allowed for schools to
withdraw a student-athlete’s scholarship for any reason, including athletic performance.13 The
NCAA finally amended this rule in 2012, and although the “Power Five” conferences all now
guarantee multiyear scholarships for student-athletes, there is a split among other NCAA
member institutions on the issue.14
Current NCAA regulations state that “[o]nly an amateur student-athlete is eligible for
intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport.”15 According to the 2020-2021 NCAA
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Rules Manual, a student-athlete is no longer considered an amateur when any of the following
conditions are met:
(a) the individual uses his or her athletics skill (“directly or indirectly”) for pay in
any form in that sport;
(b) accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following
completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;
(c) signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics,
regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received;
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any
other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based
on athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and
regulations;
(e) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional draft; or
(f) Enters into an agreement with an agent.16
The current NCAA rules allow for schools to compensate student-athletes for “actual and
necessary” expenses such as meals, lodging, equipment and supplies, and medical treatment and
physical therapy.17 Additionally, schools may compensate student-athletes for education related
expenses, such as books and technology.18 The NCAA also allows for some limited forms of
compensation unrelated to education and “actual and necessary” expenses, such as for
participation in Olympic Sports and post-season bowl games for football.19 Significantly in
2015, the NCAA allowed for the first time student-athletes to be compensated for the “cost-ofattendance”, such as travel and other expenses.20 Much of the current debate surrounding
student-athlete compensation deals specifically with these rules, and will be discussed at length
in Section III of this comment.
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Further complicating these byzantine amateurism rules, the NCAA permits certain
colleges and universities differing amounts of leeway in compensating their student-athletes
depending on their conference affiliation. In response to the staggering amounts of revenue and
attention received by the more prolific collegiate athletic departments, the NCAA granted the
“Power 5 Conferences” (Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference,
Pac-12 Conference and Southeastern Conference) and their member institutions certain levels of
autonomy “to advance the legitimate educational or athletics-related needs of student-athletes
and for legislative changes that will otherwise enhance student-athlete well-being.”21
In April 2020, due to the growing public support for changes to the amateurism model as
well as legal and legislative challenges, the NCAA Board of Governors issued a final report on
its recommendations for student-athlete compensation through third-party endorsements both
related and unrelated to athletics.22 These recommendations can be read as the NCAA’s attempt
to maintain its amateurism principles and differentiate itself from the professional leagues, while
adjusting to the reality that allowing student-athletes to profit off their name, image, and likeness
is the undeniable modern trend. The Board of Governors recommended that any changes to the
NCAA’s rules must be in accord with such principles as “maintaining the priorities of education
and the collegiate experience to provide for opportunities student”, “making clear the distinction
between collegiate and professional opportunities”, and “making clear that compensation for
athletics performance or participation is impermissible.”23 In promoting these principles in

NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N., supra note 13 at xi; see also Jon Solomon, NCAA Adopts New Division I
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23
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support of federal NIL legislation, the Board of Governors stated it would “engage Congress” to
“safeguard the nonemployment status of student-athletes” and “maintain the distinction between
college athletes and professional athletes.”24
The working group responsible for these recommendations stressed that any rule changes
must take into account the role college sports plays in higher education.25 What exactly that role
is, however, remains unclear. The NCAA appeared motivated to implement these proposed rule
changes quickly, according to Gene Smith, a member of the Board of Governors, January 31,
2021 was the target date to implement the new rules.26 The NCAA’s haste in implementing
favorable NIL rules for their member institutions is understandable, as 2021 will likely be a
landmark year for NIL legislation and legal battles overcompensation for student-athletes.
B. Legal Challenges to the NCAA’s Amateurism Model
Since the 1980’s, when the rise of cable television brought with it increased exposure for
college athletics, the NCAA has faced a series of lawsuits over compensation for both schools
and athletes.27 A significant number of these lawsuits raise anti-trust challenges to the NCAA’s
model, beginning with Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA in 1984.28 In
Board of Regents, the University of Oklahoma successfully argued that the NCAA violated
Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act by restricting the number of football games NCAA
member schools could play on national television.29 As the groundbreaking case on applying
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anti-trust law to the NCAA’s model, Board of Regents is significant in many ways, including its
application of the “rule of reason” in the context of college sports and its acknowledgment in
dicta that amateurism and competitive balance are both potential justifications for otherwise
potentially impermissible practices by the NCAA.30
Although the NCAA has argued Board of Regents created an amateurism exception under
antitrust law, Marc Edelman, a prominent sports and entertainment lawyer specializing in
student-athlete rights, has criticized this position as too broad a reading of the Court’s holding.31
Edelman argues that the Board of Regents Court referenced the value of amateurism in
considering whether to apply the rule of reason test or the per se test for illegality under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, not as carving out an entire exception for the amateurism of college
athletes.32 In this case, the Court did find in favor of applying the rule of reason test, in which the
Court analyzed the anticompetitive harm of the restriction as compared to the counteracting
procompetitive benefits of the rule.33 Additionally, Edelman references the unique style of
Justice Stevens’s opinion writing as limiting the holding of the Court to the specific facts before
the Court, which concerned the broadcast rights of college athletic departments, not the
amateurism of student-athletes.34 According to Edelman, this leaves open the possibility that
future courts may find that some NCAA amateurism rules serve as a procompetitive effect on a
Sherman Antitrust rule of reason analysis, but the holding of Board of Regents does not establish
a rule that all NCAA amateurism rules are per se legal.35
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The Board of Regents decision has gained added significance in recent years, with the
NCAA facing increased litigation concerning its amateurism rules. In 2015, The Ninth Circuit
applied Board of Regents to reach its breakthrough ruling for student-athlete rights in O’Bannon
v. NCAA (“O’Bannon II”).36 In O’Bannon II, the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s finding
that the NCAA’s amateurism rules implicated antitrust law.37
In O’Bannon II, Ed O’Bannon, a former college basketball player at the University of
California-Los Angeles, originally sued the NCAA after finding out his likeness appeared in an
officially licensed NCAA video game without his permission and without a promise of
compensation.38 O’Bannon sought to enjoin the NCAA from preventing student-athletes from
profiting off their NILs in three specific markets: (1) live game telecasts; (2) sports video games;
and (3) game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other archival footage.39 Both the district court
and Ninth Circuit found that under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the NCAA’s prevention of name,
image, and likeness payments in these markets was a commercial restraint of trade.40 To reach
this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit applied the Rule of Reason three-step burden shifting
framework to analyze the validity of the Sherman Act claims.41 In applying the Rule of Reason
analysis, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of an LRA allowing NCAA
member schools to award student-athletes full scholarships up to the Cost of Attendance.42
The Ninth Circuit however did find some of the NCAA’s arguments in favor of
preserving amateurism in college persuasive, and overruled the district court’s ruling allowing
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schools to award student-athletes up to $5,000 a year.43 In reaching this decision, the O’Bannon
II Court differentiated between payments tied to educational related activities and payments not
related to education.44 Both the Plaintiffs and NCAA appealed after the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
but the Supreme Court denied both petitions.45
In May of 2020,the 9th Circuit once again rolled back NCAA prohibitions on studentathlete compensation in In re Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., (“Alston”).46 In Alston, the Ninth Circuit ruled that NCAA limits on “non-cash
compensation related to education related benefits” for student-athletes violated antitrust law. 47
The court found that such limits did not serve a procompetitive purpose.48 Examples of
education related benefits identified by the district court include: “computers, science equipment,
musical instruments, post-eligibility scholarships to complete undergraduate or graduate degrees
at any school; scholarships to attend vocational school; expenses for pre- and post-eligibility
tutoring; expenses related to studying abroad that are not covered by the cost of attendance; and
paid post-eligibility internships.”49 To reach this conclusion, the 9th Circuit relied on demand
analyses that demonstrated that since the NCAA loosened restrictions on cost-of-attendance
payments to student-athletes after O’Bannon II, consumer demand for college sports had actually
increased.50 Additionally, the court found persuasive evidence that implementation of the
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requested seven-education related benefits would not harm demand for college sports, either.51
The court also found that the NCAA implemented the restrictions on education-related benefits
arbitrarily, and without consulting any demand analyses.52
Like O’Bannon II, however, the court found the NCAA’s prohibition on non-education
related payments permissible.53 Here, the court held that only the NCAA’s restriction on noncash education related benefits failed the antitrust Rule of Reason test.54The court found the
NCAA’s argument against “unlimited cash payments untied to education” for student-athletes
credible.55 These restrictions, the court held, served a procompetitive purpose of preventing
college sports from becoming “professionalized.”56 The court found sufficient evidence to
support the argument that the distinction between college and professional sports drives
consumer demand and benefits the sports-entertainment industry.57
Judge Milan Brown, authoring a concurring opinion in Alston, cast doubt on the
legitimacy of the Court’s interpretation of antitrust law and the amateurism of college athletes.58
Judge Brown emphasized that the harm suffered by student-athletes because of the NCAA’s
amateurism rules “is the result of a cartel of buyers acting in concert to artificially depress the
price that sellers could otherwise receive for their services.”59
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Alston represents the most significant challenge to the NCAA’s amateurism rules since at
least Board of Regents, and quite possibly ever, as the Supreme Court decided in October 2020
to grant the NCAA’s petition to hear the case.60 Supporters of both the NCAA and those in favor
of increased compensation for student-athletes see the Supreme Court’s decision as an
opportunity to finally clear up the confusion over applying antitrust law to NCAA rules and the
dicta from Board of Regents.61
On March 31, 2021, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Alston.62 The majority of
Justices seemed skeptical of the NCAA’s arguments in favor of restricting NIL compensation for
student-athletes.63 In particular, the Justices seemed concerned with “price-fixing” by the
NCAA.64Other notable moments from the Alston oral arguments included the Justices noting the
hypocrisy in paying coaches incredibly large salaries while restricting student-athlete earnings;
and the discussions around the massive revenues brought in by “powerhouse” programs.65 While
it is too early to predict how the Supreme Court will rule in Alston, the Justices’ line of
questioning seemed to indicate that they did not view the NCAA’s interpretation of amateurism
favorably.
Additionally, it is important to note another area in which the judiciary may yet involve
itself on the issue of student-athlete rights. As well as seeking the ability to benefit from their
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name, image, and likeness, and increased benefits from their respective schools, college athletes
in recent years have also attempted to obtain increased benefits through unionization.66 In 2013,
football players at Northwestern University formed the College Athletes Players Association
(“CAPA”) and sought to gain similar rights to professional athletes under the National Labor
Relations Act.67 After an initial favorable ruling for CAPA, the National Labor Relations Board
declined to address the merits of CAPA’s argument, and instead found that the unionization of
college athletes would not “promote stability in labor relations.”68 In declining the case on
jurisdictional grounds, the NLRB emphasized the transitional period college athletics was in in
2015, the inconsistency in only applying the ruling to seventeen of 128 Division 1 FBS private
colleges, and the need to resolve ongoing market issues and labor disputes in college athletics
(some of which have been now, others have not).69 The decision of NLRB is not binding and
does not require deferential treatment going forward.70 As the debate around student-athlete
group licensing and NIL continues, this is likely an important area to revisit. A proposal for a
student-athlete trade union is discussed further in Section IV.
C. State and Federal Legislation
As well as the looming Supreme Court decision in Alston, the NCAA is also dealing with
both state and federal legislation aimed at giving student-athletes increased rights to profit from
endorsement deals and their own name, image, and likeness. When NIL legislation takes effect,
whether at the state or federal level, the NCAA will enter a groundbreaking era for student-
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athlete rights. College athletic departments must be prepared to deal with the complexities of
this new era to ensure student-athletes are protected from exploitation, and that the principles of
the NCAA remain intact.
I.

Proposed State NIL Legislation

Taking effect on January 1, 2023 California’s Senate Bill 206, also known as the “Fair
Pay to Play Act”, was the first NIL bill to receive a state legislature’s approval and become
law.71 By enacting SB 206, California became the first state to allow for student-athletes to
profit off their own publicity and sign endorsement deals with third-parties without interference
from the NCAA or their own universities.72 The Act also prohibits the NCAA from preventing a
member institution from competition if the institution’s student-athletes are compensated for
profiting from the use of their name, image, or likeness.73 The Act, however, does not allow for
NCAA member schools to directly pay student-athletes.74 The NCAA staunchly opposed the
“Fair Pay to Play Act” initially, threatening to ban California schools from NCAA competitions
in what appeared to be an attempt to deter other states from passing similar legislation.75
Eventually, the NCAA changed its position on the legislation and issued its own statement
supporting student-athlete NIL rights.76
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In June 2020, Florida passed their own legislation allowing for student-athletes to profit
off from their name, image, and likeness.77 The Florida legislation, which would take effect on
July 1, 2021, is distinguished from the California “Fair Play to Pay Act” with its limits on NIL
compensation tied to “market-value” and its prohibition on compensation related to a studentathlete’s attendance at a particular university.78 The growing trend nationwide points to the vast
majority of states introducing similar legislation, at the time of this outline dozens of other
legislatures are considering their own state-specific NIL bills.79
II.

Rep. Anthony Gonzalez’s Proposed Federal Legislation

To avoid varying state enforcement of NIL legislation and litigation across multiple
states, the NCAA has advocated for a uniform federal law addressing student-athlete
compensation.80 An important aspect of the NCAA favored legislation is also antitrust
protection, which would prevent further litigation about student-athlete compensation.81 As of
January 2021, three proposals for federal NIL legislation appeared to be set for Congressional
review, one from Rep. Anthony Gonzalez (R-OH), another from Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS.),
and a third, expansive “Student-Athlete Bill of Rights” from Cory Booker (D-NJ.)82
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The proposed federal legislation from Rep. Anthony Gonzalez would allow for studentathletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness through endorsement deals, while
satisfying several NCAA requests.83 These requests include federal preemption over state law,
and restriction on student-athletes profiting from endorsement deals with certain third parties,
such as casinos and gaming companies, alcohol and tobacco companies, and marijuana
dispensaries, among others.84 Importantly, this legislation also does not classify student-athletes
as employees of their respective schools, and bars endorsement deals with persons considered
“boosters” by the NCAA.85
Rep. Gonzalez’s legislation does contain some student-athlete friendly provisions,
however.86 Notably, Rep. Gonzalez’s proposed legislation does not include antitrust protection
for the NCAA and does not restrict student-athletes from endorsing products that conflict with
their respective school’s own endorsement deals.87 Although Rep. Gonzalez’s bill includes a
Democratic co-sponsor, Rep. Emmanuel Cleaver (D-MO), experts predict that the bill will face
criticism from advocates of more expansive student-athlete rights and Democratic senators due
to the bill’s inclusion of state preemption and its lack of such provisions as long-term healthcare
for student-athletes and revenue sharing with schools.88
III.
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The second significant federal NIL legislation proposal in 2020 came from Senator Roger
Wicker, (R-MS.), chair of the Senate Commerce Committee.89 Sen. Wicker’s bill, S.5003, The
Collegiate Athlete Compensation Rights Act, contains many of the provisions sought by the
NCAA in a federal NIL law.90 The notable aspects of the Collegiate Athlete Compensation
Rights Act include restrictions on “conferences and schools from adopting any contracting, rule,
or requirement that ‘prevents or unduly restricts’ a college athlete from earning NIL
compensation.”91 The bill also allows student-athletes to hire agents to negotiate endorsement
deals with such businesses as apparel, shoe, and video game companies, and emphasizes the
need for schools to allow student-athletes to earn “market-value” for entering into such deals.92
Significantly, the Collegiate Athlete Compensation Rights Act does not include language
prohibiting student-athletes from forming a trade association or 501(c)(4) non-profit.93 If this bill
is eventually passed, this omission could provide an opportunity for student-athletes to enter into
group-licensing deals.
Unlike Rep. Gonzalez’s proposed bill, Sen. Wicker’s legislation includes the NCAA’s
sought after anti-trust protection and restrictions on endorsement deals for student-athletes which
conflict with endorsement deals for their respective schools.94 A further inclusion in Sen.
Wicker’s bill that is likely to draw criticism is the tying of NIL opportunities for student-athletes
to their number of credit hours completed in college.95 This proposal, while likely too far of a
restriction on student-athlete rights, is rooted in the important issue of educating student-athletes
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on what their NIL rights actually mean.96 The education of student-athletes on their NIL rights
and how they can profit from endorsement deals while protecting themselves from predatory
deals and actors is an issue that will be further addressed in Section III.
Also notable about the Collegiate Athlete Compensation Rights Act is the assignment of
the FTC for oversight and enforcement, with the option of promoting a nonprofit third-party for
the “daily administration of NIL activities.”97 The “Power Five” conferences are in favor of
establishing the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) as the regulator of student-athlete
endorsement deals.98 Under the NCAA’s preferred model, a “Certification Office” responsible
for licensing and regulating agents hired by student-athletes for their endorsement deals would
be established under FTC control.99
The FTC is an attractive agency to enforce any NIL legislation because the Commission
has statutory authority to regulate agents under the “Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act”
(SPARTA).100 SPARTA prohibits agents from directly or indirectly recruiting student-athletes
“by giving any false or misleading information, making a false promise or representation, or
providing anything of value to a student athlete, or anyone associated with the athlete, before he
or she has entered into an agency contract.”101 Under SPARTA, the FTC has the authority to
issue cease and desist orders and other civil penalties for violations.102 However, SPARTA has
rarely, if ever, been enforced since it was enacted in 2004, and questions exist over its efficacy in
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handling the regulation of agents.103 Industry professionals have also raised concerns about the
expertise of the FTC in handling NIL endorsement deals and the logistics of implementing a
government-run oversight body for such a broad field.104
IV.

The College Athlete Bill of Rights

Of all the proposed federal NIL legislation, by far the most expansive and favorable for
student-athletes is Cory Booker’s (D-NJ) “College Athletes Bill of Rights.”105 Senator Booker’s
bill includes many groundbreaking proposals, such as lifetime scholarships for student-athletes,
government involvement with student-athlete healthcare, a transparent donation process for
boosters, and unrestricted transfers for student-athletes.106For the purposes of this comment, the
most significant aspects of the College Athletes Bill of Rights are its requirements of revenue
sharing between colleges and student-athletes for all sports-related profits, and the opportunities
it creates for student-athletes to pursue group-licensing deals.107
Regarding the revenue-sharing portion of the College Athletes Bill of Rights, Senator
Booker proposes a 50% share of the profits between colleges and their student-athletes for their
respective sports.108This revenue sharing model could potentially lead to football and men’s
basketball players receiving six-figure payments or higher from their schools.109 To ensure fairdealing with the revenue sharing model, the bill also requires schools to provide annual reports
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on the salaries of their coaching staffs, and detailed accountings of donations made by
boosters.110
The NIL portion of the College Athletes Bill of Rights grants student-athletes a broad
range of freedom, as well. Like Rep. Gonzales’s bill, and in contrast with Senator Wicker’s
legislation, this proposal would restrict schools from preventing student-athletes from signing
endorsement deals with competitive sponsors to their respective athletic department for
promotion outside of official team activities.111 Additionally, the College Athletes Bill of Rights
allows for student-athletes to sign with agents and explicitly endorses group licensing through
either trade associations or a 501(c)(4) nonprofit.112 For enforcement purposes, Senator Booker
proposes the establishment of nine-member body appointed by the President with five spots
reserved for former college athletes and the power to investigate and fine colleges up to
$250,000 for violations of the provisions of the bill.113
PART III
Practical Issues in the Proposed Solutions
It is possible for student-athletes to receive broad NIL rights which allow them to
maximize their earnings potential all the while satisfying the NCAA’s stated goals of amateurism
and maintaining the role of college sports in the role of higher education. By doing this, studentathletes can maximize their earning potential (like any one of their classmates) while NCAA
schools do not have to take on the added expense of directly paying their student-athletes.
Additionally, this framework incentives student-athletes to stay in school rather than pursue
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professional careers prematurely out of financial necessity. Toachieve these goals, however,,
concessions must be made by both advocates for student-athlete rights and by the NCAA itself.
The risks of failing to reach a compromise which balances the valid interests of both sides
includes the continued mistreatment of student-athletes, loss of opportunities for student-athletes
in “non-revenue” sports (especially female athletes), and in an extreme scenario, the end of
scholarship athletics as a whole.
Both student-athletes and the NCAA can achieve their stated goals for student-athlete
compensation through federal NIL legislation which allows for group licensing for studentathletes and the establishment of an independent oversight and advisory committee in charge of
regulation and enforcement, all the while preserving amateurism and maintaining a clear
distinction between college sports and professional leagues. Under this proposed approach,
schools will make no direct payments to student-athletes, and payments tied specifically to
athletic performance will be prohibited. However, student-athletes will have broad freedom to
enter into endorsement deals for their NIL, sign with agents, and receive trade union status with
the opportunity to enter group licensing deals.
A. Preemption over State Law and a Limited Antitrust Exemption for the NCAA
One of the few things both the NCAA and student-athletes can agree on is the need for
federal NIL legislation.114 As Rep. Anthony Gonzalez noted in support of his proposed NIL bill,
there should be a “balance” between the needs of NCAA member institutions and student-athlete
rights.115 The parties are co-dependent on one another, and if one side is too heavily favored in
the legislation, the entire system could end up broken.
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Properly enacted federal legislation will ensure the welfare of student-athletes is
protected; and the legitimate interest the NCAA has in maintaining its amateurism rules are
maintained. Although there is a current partisan split over whether this federal NIL bill will
include preemption over state law, it is probable that preemption will likely serve the best
interests of both parties.116
Both Representative Gonzalez’s and Senator Wicker’s proposed NIL legislation include
preemption over state laws, while Senator Booker’s proposal does not.117 It is true that allowing
states to enact their own NIL laws will allow for more expansive rights for student-athletes as
states seek to attract top athletic talents to their universities. However, if preemption is not
included in a federal NIL bill, a potentially “chaotic” situation will emerge for the NCAA,
upsetting the current competitive nature of college sports.118 The NCAA maintains a valid
interest in preventing a group of schools from gaining an advantage in the recruitment of studentathletes because of NIL laws.119 This “piecemeal” state-by-state experimentation approach to
NIL legislation would go against the NCAA’s objective of providing a “fair and level playing
field for 1,100 campuses and nearly half-a-million student-athletes nationwide.”120 A possible
result of not including preemption in any federal NIL bill is that a state could pass extremely
favorable student-athlete compensation laws in which it classifies student-athletes as employees
and directs state funds to pay their salaries while not requiring any academic standards. In this
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case, the competitive balance the NCAA seeks to achieve is harmed, as are the other programs at
the state’s universities who receive less funds.
Student-athletes would benefit from federal NIL legislation as well. Federal NIL
legislation would allow a level playing field for student-athletes across the country to benefit
from their NIL, without distinction based on where they chose to attend school. Student-athletes
who choose to attend a particular university based on factors such as the school’s academic
reputation, course and major offerings, or proximity to home and family, should not be prevented
from earning the same amount as a student-athlete at a school in a different state just because
that state chose to adopt different NIL legislation.
A limited antitrust exemption may also be necessary in conjunction with a federal NIL
bill.121 While the NCAA pushes for a full antitrust exemption, a limited exemption restricting
direct payments for student-athletes and private rights of action is likely a more beneficial
approach for both colleges and student athletes.122 Critics of the antitrust exemption claim that
the exemption will infringe on free market principles and will deter colleges from enacting
favorable student-athlete compensation rules, while supporters of the limited exemption claim
that it will actually benefit the market for college sports and further the legitimate goal of
distinguishing college sports from the professional leagues.123
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This limited exemption should allow for a federal right of action, preferably brought by
an independently established commission in charge of enforcing and regulating NIL rules, to
ensure the interests of the student-athletes are protected and that colleges are in compliance with
the legislation.124 This approach likely alleviates the concern that colleges will not make any
further concessions for student-athlete compensation rights and lead to “unsubstantial unfairness
for student-athletes.”125 Justifications for the limited antitrust exemption include the argument
that distinguishing college sports from professional leagues by restricting direct payments from
colleges to athletes will benefit the market for college sports, and that the value of education for
student-athletes is integral to protecting the special status of secondary education.126
B. Group-Licensing, Trade Unions, and Few Restrictions on Endorsement Deals
The NCAA should allow broad freedom for student-athletes to pursue endorsement deals,
with limited exceptions for morality and other legal reasons. This approach would allow
student-athletes to enter endorsement deals “away from the playing field” with athletic apparel,
sneaker, or food and beverage companies that compete with endorsement deals signed by their
respective institutions. Only when student-athletes are in their official representative capacity
with their college athletic team should they be required to abide by the college’s endorsement
deals. Under this framework for example, a basketball player can sign an endorsement deal with
adidas to promote their shoes outside of NCAA competition even though their respective school
has a contractual agreement to outfit all athletic teams with Nike footwear. In this scenario, the
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student-athlete could promote adidas in his personal capacity away from competition, but still be
required to wear Nike footwear while competing for his college.
Both Senator Booker’s and Representative Gonzalez’s bills do not include restrictions on
endorsement deals between student-athletes and competitors of sponsors of their respective
schools, conflicting with both NCAA’s request in its report on NIL legislation and Senator
Wicker’s bill.127 Chief among the NCAA’s concerns on this issue is that student-athletes will
enter endorsement deals undermining the interests of their schools, and Senator Wicker’s
legislation takes this concern into account by allowing schools to prohibit conflicting
endorsements unless the ban constitutes an “undue restrict[ion].” 128
Restrictions of this nature do not further any of the NCAA’s enumerated principles or
reasons for enforcing their amateurism rules.129 While the NCAA does have a valid interest in
preventing student-athletes from entering into endorsement deals with companies such as adult
entertainment providers, casinos and gaming companies, and alcohol providers because of
various moral and legal implications, prohibiting conflicting endorsement deals does not fit in
with this category of restrictions . While a school’s financial interest is a recognized principle of
the NCAA, so is the well being of the student-athlete.130 The only practical reason for including
these restrictions is to increase athletic department profitability by limiting possible issues
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between the schools and their sponsors, resulting in undue burdens on the student-athlete by
limiting a legitimate revenue source.
Another proposed restriction by the NCAA that does not further any of its stated
principles is the proposed cap on the amount of money a student-athlete can receive from an
endorsement deal based on “fair-market value.”131 None of the proposed legislation headed for
Congressional review uses this language, however. Even Senator Wicker’s bill only refers to
“market-value” for endorsement deals.132 While it is understandable that schools wish to avoid
boosters and other third parties from engaging in “pay-for-play” schemes in which studentathletes are awarded endorsement deals which are grossly inflated, other methods of enforcement
on the issue are more suited to deal with this problem, such as transparent reporting on booster
donations and a third-party regulatory committee with investigatory power.133 Again, this
restriction does nothing to advance any legitimate NCAA’s objectives such as distinguishing
college athletics from professional ones or maintaining uniformity of rule enforcement.
Including such only harms student-athletes, and should be an area the NCAA is willing to
compromise on to receive concessions in other areas.134
The NCAA does have a valid interest in preventing student-athletes from entering into
endorsement deals with certain companies such as adult entertainment providers, casinos and
gaming companies, and alcohol providers.135 These restrictions are in line with similar ones
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imposed by professional sports leagues in “morals clauses”.136 Additionally, the NCAA does
have a valid interest in preventing student-athletes from endorsing any product while engaged in
official NCAA competitions.137 These positions are officially supported in Rep. Gonzalez’s
proposed bill.138
C. Maintaining the Differences between College Athletics and Professional Leagues
Maintaining a distinction between NCAA sponsored competitions and professional
leagues is a legitimate goal that should be achieved in federal NIL legislation. As this is the
case, it would likely be beneficial for the future of college sports that student-athletes are not
considered as employees of their respective schools in NIL legislation. In addition to blurring
the lines of professional and college sports and harming the NCAA’s legitimate aim of
distinguishing its product from that of professional sports, classifying student-athletes as
employees of schools will place an enormous financial strain on athletic departments.148 This
impact on athletic departments could result in the cutting of varsity sports and elimination of
scholarship opportunities for other student athletes in favor of the “revenue sports” (football,
men’s basketball, women’s basketball).149
The argument that the NCAA has a compelling interest in differentiating between college
and professionalized sports is a convincing one150 Similar to the reasoning of the Alston court,
the amateurism of college sports attracts interest from consumers and serves a procompetitive
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purpose of distinguishing college athletics from professional sports.151 Both Representative
Gonzalez’s and Senator Wicker’s bills declare that student-athletes are not employees of their
colleges.152 Senator Booker’s bill does not officially take a stance on the employment status of
student-athletes.153 Importantly in Senator Wicker’s bill, there is no language barring the
possibility of student-athletes forming a trade association or 501(c)(3) nonprofit.154 By following
Senator Wicker’s model, student-athletes can still organize and have adequate labor protections,
and colleges do not have to take on the added costs of hundreds of new employees in their
athletic departments.
The NCAA should also leave in place restrictions on schools directly compensating
student-athletes for their NILs.155 The rulings in O’Bannon II and Alston support the position that
NCAA has a valid interest in preserving some form of amateurism for its student athletes.156 The
key factor in the courts’ interpretation of amateurism is the restriction on payments from schools
not tied to any education related benefits.157
Schools classifying student-athletes as employees and paying them directly may also
come into conflict with Title IX rules.158 Title IX requires schools provide equitable
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opportunities to male and female student-athletes based on interest and participation numbers.159
Financial support for benefits and promotions, recruitment, and support services must be equal
between male and female athletes at schools receiving federal funding.160 By classifying studentathletes as employees, colleges run the risk of devoting too much money to athletes in the
revenue sports, which are overwhelmingly male, and neglecting their obligations to female
athletes.161
D. Group Licensing and aThird-Party Oversight Committee Responsible for
Regulation and Enforcement
A third-party committee responsible for regulation and enforcement of violations would
be the most efficient and balanced option to ensure compliance with NIL rules and oversee
student-athlete enforcement deals. Both Senator Wicker’s and Senator Booker’s proposed
legislations contemplate the creation of an oversight committee.162 To operate effectively, this
committee should also be granted a federal right of action to enforce NIL rules. The right of
action would conform to the limited anti-trust exemption previously discussed. This theoretical
oversight body could also include equal representation from NCAA member institutions, former
athletes from “revenue sports” (football, men’s basketball, women’s basketball), former athletes
from “Olympic Sports” (such as track and field and swimming and diving) and experienced
industry professionals (retired sports agents/judges) to act as quasi-arbitrators. Equal
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representation is necessary from all interested parties to ensure that student-athletes in all sports
receive equal treatment from NCAA rules and NIL legislation.
The role of the oversight body would be to regulate and issue licenses to prospective
agents interested in working with student-athletes, ensure endorsement deals comply with NCAA
rules, and monitor activity of colleges to avoid any “pay-to-play” deals. The oversight board
would hopefully take a more active role in its administration than the current NCAA
enforcement staff, preventing such incidents as the college basketball corruption scandals.163
Borrowing from Senator Wicker’s proposal, this committee should also be in charge of educating
student-athletes on what their NIL rights actually means.164
Furthermore, an independent commission is preferable because of the enormity of
enforcing the provisions of any federal NIL legislation. Burdening the FTC with the role of NIL
enforcement will likely lead to a number of issues. Critics have raised concerns about the
effectiveness of a government oversight body for the provisions of NIL legislation, such as the
framework proposed by Senator Wicker.165 Inexperience with the complexities of NCAA rules
and endorsement contracts, and the effectiveness of SPARTA are areas of concern about how
effective a government oversight body would operate.166
However, the framework in Senator Booker’s legislation, a committee made up of at least
nine members from various backgrounds representing the legal profession and college athletics
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with subpoena power, appears to be a step in the right direction.167 While lacking in
representation from NCAA member schools, and including some questionable enforcement
powers (such as banning individuals from working in college athletics), Senator Booker’s
independent commission does take into consideration representation from the various parties
invested in the future of college athletics, and provides a form of protection for studentathletes.168
Whether it is included in the NIL legislation, or the NCAA amends its rules to permit it,
student-athletes should also be allowed to enter group-licensing agreements with athletic
associations, conferences, and their respective schools.169 Group licensing is included the
proposed legislation from Senator Cory Booker, but is not explicitly included in Representative
Gonzalez’s bill nor Senator Wicker’s legislation.170 To the surprise of many involved with
college sports, the NCAA inexplicably failed to include a provision for group licensing in its
April 2020 report on student-athlete compensation.171 Industry experts speculate that the NCAA
feared further encroaching on the “employee-employer” relationship with student-athletes if it
allowed for group-licensing in its proposal.172 Although the NCAA claimed group licensing
appeared unworkable without a union (and thus another step towards classifying student-athletes
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as employees), skeptics strenuously disagree with that assertion, claiming the NCAA’s stance is
“self-serving” and “misleading”.173
The ability to group license paves the way for student-athletes to profit off their NILs in
video games, a massively profitable market.174 Before O’Bannon and O’Bannon II forced the
NCAA to change its approach to the use of player likeness, video games such as NCAA Football
2014 were widely popular.175 Group licensing also allows for student-athletes to enter into
apparel and memorabilia deals.176 A significant benefit of allowing group licensing is that it
allows a greater number of student-athletes to profit from their NIL.177 Instead of just the
superstars of athletic teams being able to profit from their NIL from endorsement deals, group
licensing deals would enable lesser known players to be compensated for their time and effort as
well.
PART IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the NCAA, college athletic directors and presidents, and politicians,
should work together to compromise on NIL legislation which provide student-athletes the same
opportunities as their fellow classmates. This goal is possible without sacrificing the NCAA’s
core principles, but the NCAA must be willing to relent on some of its harsher restrictions on
student-athlete endorsements from competitive sponsors and group-licensing.178 By
compromising on these issues, the NCAA would be allowing its student-athletes to increase their

173

Dellenger, supra note 134.
Dellenger, supra note 77.
175
Steven Godfrey, Why has NCAA Football’s Popularity Exploded Mid-Pandemic? BANNER SOCIETY, (May 13,
2020), https://www.bannersociety.com/2020/5/13/21257660/ncaa-football-2014-ea-sports-video-game-ebay-resaleprices; Dellenger, supra note 134.
176
Dellenger, supra note 134.
177
Dellenger, supra note 134.
178
See generally Mayer, supra note 5.
174

opportunities for profitability, likely without significant impact to their own revenues and while
protecting their stated mission. Additionally, the NCAA would likely improve the
Furthermore, with compensation for student-athletes enrolled at NCAA member schools
becoming a reality through state and possible federal legislation, group licensing and a thirdparty oversight body are necessary to protect the welfare of all student-athletes. The benefits of
a third-party oversight body include protection of student-athletes from predatory contracts and
agents, ensuring compliance with NCAA rules and regulations free of conflicts of interest, and a
resource for student-athletes to educate themselves about their possible profitability.
While the landscape of college athletics is undoubtedly in for some seismic changes in
the near future, by implementing federal NIL legislation with the aforementioned provisions, the
NCAA will have the opportunity to sponsor its best product yet, college sports where studentathletes are on a “level playing field” with their classmates and can profit from their own worth.

